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A b s tra c t
We tentatively propose two guiding principles for the construction of theories of physics, which 
should be satisfied by a possible future theory of quantum gravity. These principles are inspired 
by those that led Einstein to his theory of general relativity, viz. his principle of general covariance 
and his equivalence principle, as well as by the two mysterious dogmas of Bohr’s interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, i.e. his doctrine of classical concepts and his principle of complementarity. An 
appropriate mathematical language for combining these ideas is topos theory, a framework earlier 
proposed for physics by Isham and collaborators.
Our principle of general tovariance states that any mathematical structure appearing in the 
laws of physics must be definable in an arbitrary topos (with natural numbers object) and must 
be preserved under so-called geometric morphisms. This principle identifies geometric logic as the 
mathematical language of physics and restricts the constructions and theorems to those valid in 
intuitionism: neither Aristotle’s principle of the excluded third nor Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice may 
be invoked. Subsequently, our equivalence principle states that any algebra of observables (initially 
defined in the topos S e ts) is empirically equivalent to a commutative one in some other topos.
M o tto
‘At a certain  point in its history, the fundam ental problems of physics have to  do w ith the  way 
in which fundam ental concepts are defined. In those circum stances, the  pursu it of physics in 
accord w ith those concepts evidently has not resolved the underlying problems. These are 
the  tim es a t which philosophical analysis has become an unavoidable task  of physics itself.’
(R. DiSalle [9])
Dedicated to Klaus Fredenhagen, at his 60th birthday
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1 Old principles
After decades of stagnation  [28, 30], the possibility suggests itself th a t the present difficulties in con­
structing  a satisfactory quantum  theory  of gravity  reflect insufficient understanding of the foundations of 
quantum  mechanics and its relationship to  general relativity. In fact, our knowledge of the foundations 
of both theories is questionable and one can hardly  expect a successful merge before these foundations 
have been clarified. Thus instead of taking quantum  theory a t face value and following the  “shut up 
and calculate” philosophy common in string theory  and (less so) in loop quantum  gravity, we believe 
th a t the road to  progress lies in entering a process of clarifying the foundations of quantum  theory 
and general relativity, preferably in in teraction w ith each other. This process m ight eventually suggest 
m odifications to  bo th  theories even a t the level a t which they  are currently  defined (i.e. quantum  theory 
w ithout gravity and classical general relativity).
Even w ithout the desire to  incorporate general relativity, in quantum  theory  the emergence of classi- 
cality  is a m ajor concern [21]. In our opinion, th is issue will have to  be understood in conjunction w ith 
the question of (in)determ inism  in quantum  mechanics; these are two sides of the same coin. W ithout 
th is jo in t perspective, the relationship between the logical and the probabilistic struc tu re  of quantum  
m echanics is obscure.1 The present paper, which was p a rtly  inspired by the papers of Isham  and col­
laborators [15, 10] and p a rtly  by thoughts on general relativ ity  (as suggested above), is m eant as a first 
step  towards the clarification of the  relationship in question. It seems inconceivable th a t a successful 
theory  of quantum  gravity  can be found before th is has been done.
To s ta r t w ith general relativity, it is well known th a t E instein, despite being single-handedly respon­
sible for one of the  high points in hum an thought in form ulating the theory  of general relativity, was 
actually  som ewhat confused about the foundations of his own theory  (see [16] for m ost of the  original 
papers and cf. [25] for a survey of bo th  the prim ary and the  secondary literature). O n his road to  general 
relativity, E instein was guided by three principles: the principle o f general covariance, the  equivalence 
principle  and M ach’s principle. All three are controversial, bu t the la tte r seems particu larly  ill-founded 
and E instein eventually abandoned it himself. I t will play no role in our considerations.
The principle of general covariance was originally m eant by E instein as an expression of the  idea of 
the general relativ ity  of m otion, b u t th is idea is flawed. In fact, general relativ ity  singles out geodesics 
as preferred carriers of m otion, much like the inertial frames in N ewtonian mechanics and special rela­
tivity. Moreover, general covariance has been claimed to  be vacuous. This, however, is an exaggeration: 
general covariance delineates the  m athem atical framework of E inste in ’s theory  as differential geometry. 
Ironically, th is framework applies to  classical mechanics and special relativ ity  as well; the  essence of 
general relativ ity  lies in the  dynam ical role of the  space-tim e m etric.
An appropriate version of the  equivalence principle sta tes th a t free fall in a gravitational field is locally 
indistinguishable from rest or uniform  m otion in Minkowski space-tim e w ithout gravitational forces, and 
hence locally free fall defines an inertial frame. A lthough also th is principle has been derided, we follow 
E instein himself as well as the rational reconstruction of his thought by DiSalle [9] in a ttaching great 
im portance to  it. Namely, the equivalence principle makes the N ewtonian separation  between inertial 
m otion and acceleration ill-defined in case th a t the la tte r is caused by gravity, and furtherm ore it leads 
to  the  seemingly paradoxical feature th a t in the presence of gravity  different locally inertial frames are 
not inertial w ith respect to  each o ther (as they  would be w ithout gravity). In com bination w ith general 
covariance, i.e. the  geometric framework of the theory, the equivalence principle then  enables one to  
solve b o th  problem s a t one stroke by identifying inertial m otion in a gravitational field w ith geodesic 
m otion in a curved space-time. All th a t rem ained for E instein was to  find the relationship between 
curvature and m a tte r distribution, a (still Herculean) task  he accomplished by discovering the equations 
now nam ed after him.
E instein ’s great antagonist was Bohr. His understanding of quantum  mechanics was expressed by 
two principles: the doctrine o f classical concepts and the  principle o f complementarity  (see [18] for the 
original papers and [27] for penetra ting  analysis). Significantly, whereas E instein had  his principles 
before his theory, Bohr form ulated them  after the com pletion of quantum  mechanics. Nonetheless, his
1The quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann [5, 8] has actually clarified neither the logical foundation of quantum 
theory nor its probabilistic structure. Indeed, its lack of distributivity and of a satisfactory implication, as well as its 
inherent propositional (as opposed to predicate) form has defied a reasonable interpretation and application of quantum 
logic. These difficulties reflect the lack of integration of quantum logic with modern logic, especially with categorical logic 
and topos theory [17, 22]. Also, the goal of deriving quantum theory from quantum-logical axioms has not been achieved, 
despite impressive attempts [26].
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principles are even more obscure th an  E instein ’s, and in fact it seems th a t only some people who have 
known Bohr personally still endorse them . This is a pity, because in our opinion the door to  quantum  
gravity is opened by reform ulating B ohr’s principles of quantum  mechanics in a way inspired by E instein ’s 
principles of gravity.2 To do so, we tu rn  to  topos theory.3
2 W hat is a topos?
According to  M cLarty [23], ‘E lem entary toposes arose when Lawvere’s in terests in the  foundations of 
physics and T ierney’s in the  foundations of topology led bo th  to  study  G rothendieck’s foundations for 
algebraic geom etry.’4 Topos theory  has quite appropriately  been com pared w ith an elephant as regards 
size, complexity, and the possibility of adopting seemingly different points of view [17]. Indeed, the first 
sentence of the well-known book by Mac Lane and M oerdijk on topos theory  [22] is this:
‘A startling  aspect of topos theory  is th a t it unifies two seemingly wholly distinct m athe­
m atical subjects: on the one hand, topology and algebraic geom etry and on the  o ther hand, 
logic and set theory .’
This is elaborated  by Vickers [29], as follows:
‘We have, on the one hand, the  logic and the set theory, and, on the  other, the  topology.
In a nutshell, the  topos connection between them  is th a t the topos acts like a “Lindenbaum  
algebra” (of formulae m odulo equivalence) for a logical theory  whose models are the  points 
of a space.’
Indeed, topoi provide sem antics for in tuitionistic predicate logic, and as such generalize frames (or, 
equivalently, Heyting algebras) as the appropriate sem antics for in tuitionistic propositional logic [29].5 
Here one looks at frames as the Lindenbaum  algebras of in tuitionistic propositional logic.6 Thus a topos 
is som ething like the “Lindenbaum  algebra” (technically, the classifying topos) of some intuitionistic 
predicate logic [29].
Most presentations of the  subject, however, s ta r t from the idea th a t topoi generalize the category 
S e ts  of sets and functions. This approach defines a topos as a category with:
1. Term inal object; 2. Exponentials; 3. Pullbacks; 4. Subobject classifier.
These generalize, respectively, the following constructions in S e ts :
1. An a rb itra ry  singleton 1 (in th a t from any set X  there is a unique arrow X  ^  1);
2. Sets Y X  consisting of all functions X  Y , for a rb itra ry  sets X  and Y ;
3. F ibered products B  Xa C  =  {(b, c) G B  x  C  | f  (b) =  g(c)} of B  A and C  A, along w ith the 
obvious projection m aps B  ^  B  Xa C  ^  C ;
4. The set Q =  {0,1} in its role as the codom ain of characteristic functions of subsets: given an 
inclusion A C B  of sets, one can reconstruct A from its characteristic function B  ^4 Q and, vice 
versa, xa  is of course defined by A.
In a general topos, Q comes w ith an arrow 1 Q called truth, such th a t for every m onom orphism  
A B  (i.e. injection in the  categorical sense, often denoted by A ^  B ) there is a unique arrow B  ^4 Q
2 See also [20] for a different attempt at a peaceful resolution to the Bohr—Einstein debate.
3To get familiar with topos theory, it is advisable to study [12, 22, 17] in the given order.
4See also [19] for a general history of category theory. In the original work of Grothendieck [1], topoi generalize 
topological spaces, in that open sets are generalized by “set-valued” opens, or sheaves. Lawvere’s ideas on the connection 
with physics are elaborated in [3].
5 A frame is a sup-complete distributive lattice such that x x Ay\. For example, if X is a topological space, 
then the topology (i.e. the set of open sets) O(X)  of X is a frame with U < V if U C V. Frames are sometimes called 
locales, but the category of locales is the opposite category to the category of frames. This seemingly curious convention 
guarantees that, in the above example, a continuous map ƒ : X ^  Y induces a map ƒ* : O(X) ^  O(Y) between the 
associated locales, defined as ƒ * = ƒ—1 : O(Y) ^  O(X) read in the opposite direction. The mind boggles!
6These are given by the set of formulae modulo provable equivalence, ordered by entailment.
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for which B  A  A  a  1 is a pullback of B  A  Q and 1 A  Q.7 Amazingly, Q =  {0,1} in its role as the 
subobject classifier in the topos S e ts  carries the entire logical s truc tu re  of classical m athem atics. In 
general, in an a rb itra ry  topos Q is a so-called Heyting algebra, which provides an algebraic description of 
some in tuitionistic propositional logic intrinsic to  the topos a t hand. In such a logic, neither A risto tle’s 
principle of the  excluded th ird ,8 nor Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice necessarily holds.9
3 States, propositions and truth
The logical perspective on topos theory, culm inating in the  decisive role of the subobject classifier, 
explains its poten tia l relevance for physics. For, as em phasized by Isham  and collaborators [15, 10], the 
topos framework leads to  a new way of th inking about tru th  in quantum  mechanics. Traditionally, the 
m athem atical arena of b o th  classical and quantum  physics has - in blissful ignorance - sim ply been the 
topos S e t s . B oth  are based on a pairing (w, P } a  [0,1], where w is a s ta te  and P  is an elem entary 
proposition (or “yes-no question” ). The num ber (w ,P } equals the probability  th a t the proposition P  
is tru e  in the sta te  w. E lem entary propositions are of the form P  =  a G U , where a is an observable 
and U C R. It will be sufficient to  deal w ith the case U =  (r, s); more generally, one m ay assume th a t 
U is regular open (i.e. U coincides w ith the  interior of its closure).10 In classical physics, th is scheme 
works fine. An observable a is a real-valued function M  A  R  on some phase space M , and a yes-no 
question a G U m ay be identified w ith the  subset [a G U] =  a - 1 (U ) C M . (More precisely, a G U 
should be identified w ith the equivalence class of all propositions b G V w ith the same inverse image
p
b- 1 (V ) =  a - 1 (U ).) This subset is open if a is continuous, and defines a m onom orphism  a - 1 (U ) a  M ,
characterized by its classifying arrow M  “— iU) Q. A pure sta te  w is ju s t a point of M , hence a 
m onom orphism  1 A  M . Com position of w and x a-*(u ) yields an arrow
1 - A  Q =  1 A  M  X— A ) Q, (1)
which is precisely the tru th  value of the  proposition P  =  a G U in the sta te  w, i.e. (w, P} is tru e  or equal 
to  1 if w G a - 1 (U ) (or a(w) G U ) and false or equal to  0 otherwise.
Thus the subobject classifier
Q =  {0,1} =  {± , T} =  {false, true} =  {no, yes} (2)
in the  topos S e ts  is the carrier of tru th  values of yes-no questions, the  tru th  (i.e. answer “yes” ) or 
falsehood (i.e. answer “no” ) of such questions being assigned by some pure sta te . If the  sta te  is mixed, 
the tru th  value of a yes-no question is a point in [0,1], in terpreted  as the probability  th a t the  answer to  
the question is “yes.” This is unproblem atic in classical physics, as the decom position of a mixed sta te  
w into pure com ponents leads to  an associated decom position of the  pairing (w ,P } into term s th a t are 
either equal to  0 or to  1.
From a localic point of view, one ra th e r works w ith the topology O (M ) instead of w ith M  itself.
Still working in S e ts , our yes-no question P  =  a G U is ju s t an arrow 1 a —A ) O (M ) =  1 A  O (M ). A 
pure s ta te  w is now represented by the  subobject S A C O (M ) given by
SA =  {V G O (M ) | w G V }. (3)
The pairing m ap becomes
1 —A  Q =  1 A  O (M ) Q, (4)
7 For example, in the topos Sh(X) of sheaves over a topological space X the subobject classifier is the functor U i  O(U), 
acting on arrows (i.e. inclusions) U < V as O(V) i  O(U), W ^  W  Pi U.
8In the example Sh(X) the logical operations on the internal Heyting algebra Q : U ^  O(U) are computed pointwise:
truth 1 Q is T = U, false 1 i  Q is ± =  0, negation — : Q ^  Q is —V = int(U\V), conjunction A : Q x Q ^  Q is
V A W = V P W, disjunction V :Q x Q i  Qis V V W = V U W, and finally (material) implication ^ :  Q x Q i  Q reads
V ^  W = int((U\V) U W). Consequently, V V—V = U\dV = U = T.
9In the sense that any epimorphism, i.e. categorical surjection, has a right inverse.
10If one admits general open sets, the logic of classical mechanics already comes out as intuitionistic! This is because 
the open subsets of a topological space do not form a Boolean algebra under natural operations.
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where is the  classifying m ap of SA a  O (M ). Of course, one has (P, w} =  (w ,P }; cf. (1). I t is 
th is localic form ulation of the state-proposition  pairing th a t can be generalized to  quantum  theory, as 
follows.11
Let C(A) be the collection of com m utative un ita l C*-subalgebras of a un ita l C*-algebra A, partially  
ordered by inclusion (seen as a category in the usual way) and let T (A ) be the topos S e ts C(A) of functors 
C(A) a  S e ts . The m ap th a t sends C (seen as an object in C(A)) into itself (seen as a set) is functorial in 
the obvious way and defines an object A in T (A ). This object is a com mutative C*-algebra in T (A ) in a 
n a tu ra l way.12 We call A the Bohrification  of A. There is a Gelfand theory  for com m utative C*-algebras 
in topoi [2],13 and the Gelfand spectrum  £  of A is autom atically  a (com pact com pletely regular) locale.
This locale, which is explicitly described in [14], plays a central role in the logical analysis of the 
quantum  theory  defined by A. Being a locale, it is autom atically  a Heyting algebra, carrying the 
in tu itionistic  propositional logic intrinsic to  the  theory. This logic is ‘sp a tia l’ in the sense th a t its 
elem entary propositions correspond to  arrows 1 a  £ ; as in the  classical case £  =  O (M ), we regard such 
arrows as open subsets of the  space th a t formally underlies the  locale £ . The relationship between the 
original observables of the system  and such propositions is not obvious,14 b u t it tu rn s  out th a t, as in 
classical physics, a self-adjoint elem ent a G A and an interval (r, s) C R  define an arrow (i.e. ‘open se t’)
[a£(r S)]
1 — A £ . In addition, one m ay generalize (3) in associating a subobject of £  to  a s ta te  w on A [7, 14]. 
At the  end of the day, this leads to  pairing m ap defined exactly  as in (4), bu t now taking values in the 
subobject classifier of the  topos T (A ) a t hand.
This suggests th a t, quite generally, the  subobject classifier plays the role of the codom ain of the 
pairing m ap between (pure) sta tes and yes-no questions. Thus the answers to  such questions are neither 
lim ited to  “yes” or “no” , nor to  some num ber in the interval [0,1] playing the role of some probability. 
Instead, as suggested in [15, 10], t ru th  becomes an - a priori non-probabilistic - m ulti-valued notion in 
non-classical theories of physics like quantum  mechanics. I t is precisely the a ttrac tio n  of topos theory 
for physics th a t th is theory  provides a formal setting  for such an idea.15
T ru th  is prior to  probability, and the next step  would consist in deriving the notion of ordinary 
probability  and the  Born rule from m ulti-valued tru th  assignm ents in a suitable topos.
4 N ew  principles
Having in troduced the notion of a topos and its m otivation for physics, we wish to  re tu rn  to  the task  of 
finding suitable principles th a t m ight underlie quantum  gravity. Before doing so, however, we need one 
more ingredient of topos theory  [17, 22, 29].
So far, we have seen th a t topoi generalize frames (the generalization being from propositional to  
predicate logic), which in tu rn  generalize topological spaces: such a space X  defines the frame O (X ) 
of all open sets, bu t not all frames are of th is form. Nonetheless, the notion of a m ap between frames 
is taken  from th is example: if ƒ : X  a  Y  is continuous, then  the  induced m ap ƒ -1  : O (Y ) a  O (X ) 
is a la ttice  m orphism  preserving fin ite  A and all V. Hence also in general, frame m aps are defined in 
th is way. It is clear from the definition of a frame th a t such m aps are quite natural, bu t they  have the 
disadvantage th a t they  do not preserve the entire logical (i.e. Heyting algebra) s truc tu re  encoded in a 
frame: (m aterial) im plication and hence negation are not necessarily preserved. Recalling th a t frames 
are L indenbaum  algebras of in tuitionistic propositional logics, th is problem  m ay be circum vented by
11Our construction was inspired by the work of Doring and Isham [10], from which it differs in several respects. For 
example, whereas Doring and Isham work with spaces, we work with locales. This is a mathematical reflection of the 
difference between the philosophical ideas of Heidegger [10] and Bohr [14].
12In a paper dedicated to Klaus Fredenhagen, it may be appropriate to point out that an algebraic quantum field theory 
may not just be seen as a functor, as in [6], but as a single C*-algebra in the topos of pre-cosheaves over space-time, by a 
similar construction as in the main text.
13The Gelfand spectrum £ of A, seen as a frame or locale, is the Lindenbaum algebra of the logical theory defined by 
propositions of the form a E U indexed by a E A and U E O(C), subject to relations suggested by the situation in Sets. 
One then has an isomorphism A = C(£), where C(£) stands for the set of locale maps from £ to O(C) and hence of frame 
maps in the opposite direction. The Gelfand transform of a E A is d : O(C) i  £, U i  [a E U] (i.e. the equivalence class 
of the proposition a E U, which by definition of £ is an element of it).
14The difficulty lies in associating an element of A to one of A. This is achieved in [14] by a modification of the 
‘Daseinization’ map of Doring and Isham [10].
15There is a clear parallel with model theory here, in that through the pairing map each state w defines a model of the 
logical theory underlying the spectral object £ (seen as a frame or Heyting algebra) taking values in Q. This generalizes 
the Boolean models of classical logic, which in turn generalize the simplest models of logic taking values in {0,1} = (±, T}.
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only allowing such logical theories th a t in addition are geometric. This curious nam e (whose origin lies 
in fact in the geometric side of topos theory) s tands for the fragm ent of in tuitionistic propositional logic 
whose formulae are of the form a  0 , where and 0  are built from atom ic propositions using the 
symbols T  (for “tru th ” ), A (for “and” ), and V (for “or” ), where V but not A is allowed to  carry  an 
infinite index set. This m ay be m otivated by the rem ark th a t to  verify a proposition VAeaPa one only 
needs to  find a single p A, whereas to  verify AAeaPa the tru th  of each p A needs to  be established, an 
impossible task  in practice when A is infinite. One m ay then  say th a t frame m aps preserve “geom etric” 
propositional logical theories.
This idea generalizes to  predicate logic, and hence to  topos theory. A geometric in tuitionistic pred­
icate logic is a theory  whose formulae are as above,16 now also involving the existential quantifier 3, 
and whose axioms take the form Vx : y>(x) a  0 (x ) .17 The generalization of a frame m ap to  topos 
theory  is, then, a so-called geometric morphism, whose reason of existence is to  preserve “geom etric” 
first order theories. Specifically, a geometric m orphism  F  a  E  is functor ^* : F  a  E  w ith  left adjoint 
4>* : E  a  F  th a t preserves finite lim its (and also, autom atically  as a left adjoint, all colimits). Hence the 
‘inverse image p a r t ’ ^* of a geometric m orphism  preserves any m athem atical s truc tu re  in a topos th a t 
is axiom atized “geom etrically” in the  sense ju s t described; it m ay be seen as the u ltim ate  generalization 
of a continuous m ap between topological spaces. Thus geometric m orphism s form the n a tu ra l m aps 
between topoi.
For the sim plest examples of geometric morphism s, consider the presheaf topos S e ts  of functors 
from a category C to  S e ts . Then for each C  G C one has a geometric m orphism  ^ C : S e ts  a  S e ts C 
w ith inverse image <jfC =  e v C : S e ts C a  S e ts , i.e. the  evaluation m ap given by e v C( F ) =  F ( C ). 
In particular, for C =  C(A) and F  =  A one obtains e v C (A) =  C . Hence selecting a com m utative 
C * -subalgebra C  C A from the Bohrification A of A is a geom etric operation; physically, th is picks a 
classical con tex t.18 In the opposite direction, there is a unique geometric m orphism  0  : S e ts C a  S e ts  
w ith inverse image 0* : S e ts  a  S e ts C given as the constan t functor 0 ( X ) : C  a  X  for all C  G C.
E instein ’s principle of general covariance then  has a n a tu ra l analogue in topos theory, which we call 
the p r in c ip le  o f  g e n e ra l to v a r ia n c e : any m athem atical s truc tu re  appearing in the laws of physics 
m ust be definable in an a rb itra ry  topos (w ith n a tu ra l num bers object) and m ust be preserved under 
geometric morphism s. Like the principle of general covariance, the  principle of general tovariance has 
no im m ediate physical content, bu t merely serves to  identify the m athem atical language of physics. 
W here general covariance m eant differential geometry, general tovariance implies geometric logic.19 In 
particular, it restric ts the m athem atical objects th a t m ay occur in physics to  those whose core can be 
axiom atized through geometric logic. I t seems to  us th a t th is requirem ent is the correct form alization 
of the fam iliar idea th a t physics a t the Planck scale be finite (or at least discrete). O ur principle also 
expresses the  idea th a t physics should be as independent as possible of the m athem atical framework (to 
the extent th a t different topoi s tand  for different m athem atical universes).20
W hich m athem atical theories are “geom etric” in th is sense? As far as physically relevant structures 
are concerned, we m ention differential geometry, albeit in algebraic form (i.e. instead of sm ooth manifolds 
M  one works w ith the  function ring C TO(M ), etc.) [24], as well as pre-quasi-C*-algebras. These are 
“alm ost” C * -algebras, except th a t the norm  is actually  a sem i-norm  and th a t the underlying space may 
not be com plete.21 The usual process of tu rn ing  a pre-quasi-C*-algebra into an actual C*-algebra by 
quotienting by the zero-norm  subspace and com pleting tu rns out to  be nongeom etric,22 bu t th is is of 
little  concern, because w hat m atters  is a given, “coordinate invariant” theory, which m ay be tu rned  into
16The atomic formulae may now involve relations and equalities and all the usual structures allowed in first-order logic 
as well.
17In both cases deductions {<^ 1 , . . . ,  <^n} i  ^  are made from lists of finitely many formulae to single formulae. See [29] 
and [17] for details.
18Continuing footnote 12, the map O i  A(O) defining an algebraic quantum field theory comes out as geometric in 
exactly the same way.
19Thus the tendentious slogan that “physics is information” has to be replaced by the idea that physics is logic.
20From this perspective the situation is not just similar to general relativity, but also to algebraic quantum field theory. 
Indeed, passing from a Hilbert space framework to a C*-algebraic one captures the idea of the representation-independence 
of the underlying theory, a point emphasized by Haag and Kastler [13] through their appeal to Fell’s theorem [11]: If A is 
a simple C*-algebra and n is a representation, the normal states on n(A) are weak* dense in the state space of A. Hence 
according to Haag and Kastler all representations of A are ‘physically equivalent’.
21 Since suprema and infima may not exist in an arbitrary topos, one has to look at the seminorm in an unusual way; 
roughly speaking, it is defined by specifying N(q) = {a E A | ||a|| < q}, where q is rational, instead of || • || itself.
22Equivalently, applying the inverse image part of a geometric morphism to a C*-algebra fails to preserve completeness 
and the definiteness of the norm. We are indebted to Chris Mulvey for explaining this point.
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an (internal) C*-algebra in an a rb itra ry  topos by the said, “non-invariant” procedure.
We are now in a position to  generalize B ohr’s doctrine of classical concepts in a way rem iniscent 
of E instein ’s equivalence principle: we postu late  th a t any algebra o f observables is empirically indistin­
guishable from  a com mutative one.23 Much as an observer can locally avoid the gravitational force by 
moving along a geodesic (which in E instein ’s view am ounted to  a special choice of coordinates), an ob­
server in quantum  theory  can get rid  of the noncom m utativ ity  of a C*-algebra of observables by moving 
to  a very special topos in which it becomes com m utative.24 This sounds paradoxical, and indeed it has 
been suggested th a t B ohr was sim ply incom petent [4]. However, we have seen in the  previous section 
th a t the  above equivalence principle can indeed be im plem ented [14]. The use of topos theory  then 
autom atically  takes care of com plem entarity, in the sense th a t m utually  exclusive classical snapshots 
of reality  na tu ra lly  combine into a single in ternal com m utative C*-algebra, which carries all physical 
inform ation.25
N o te  added: Following talks by the second au thor a t Lisbon, Princeton and H am burg in the  Fall of 
2007, an interesting discussion on General Tovariance has emerged in the  n-C ategory Cafe 
h t tp : / /g o le m .p h .u te x a s .e d u /c a t e g o r y , see December 5, 2007. We hope th is paper clarifies the m ain 
issues raised there.
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